BOOK REVIEWS
Land Planning Law in a Free Society: A Study of the British Town and Country Planning Act. By Charles M. Haar. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1951. Pp. xiii, 213. $4.00.
I
One of the inevitable effects of the progressive extension of government control over economic life is that economic problems are increasingly disposed of
by lawyers, technologists and experts in "administration." It might be expected
that this would lead to an increased understanding of economics in these professions. This expectation has generally been frustrated-it almost seems as if
those who ardently believe that they can solve economic problems by central
planning in most instances do so precisely because they are unaware of what
the economic problems are.
There is no better illustration of this than town planning-a subject which,
it must be admitted, has been sadly neglected by economists. And there could
be hardly a more telling demonstration of the complete lack of comprehension of
the economic problems which the use of land raises for society than the present
careful and painstaking study of the new British Town and Country Planning
Act of 1947 by an American student of Public Administration. Wile the book
presents a sympathetic interpretation of that experiment, in the sense that
Mr. Haar fully shares the outlook which inspires it, it is as devoid of any appreciation of the wider economic issues involved as were the group of architects
and administrators who, in the peculiar circumstances of Britain between 1940
and 1947, were almost exclusively responsible for this piece of legislation. The
book does not even take notice of the few critical analyses of the Act which appeared when the British economists were at last released from the moie important preoccupation of winning the war. In particular the author ignores the
masterly analysis of the problem by Sir Arnold Plant' and the severe criticism
which the measure has received from groups which one might expect to be
sympathetic towards it, such as the followers of Henry George.
After reading the book one feels some doubt whether the author, any more
than the legislators or the British public at large is fully aware of how completely the Act has changed the whole character of the British economic system.
While entirely suspending the operation of the price mechanism with regard to
land (outside agricultural uses) it has put nothing in its place except arbitrary
decision without even a general principle to guide it. What the Act has decreed
, Plant, Land Planning and the Economic Functions of Ownership,
tioneers and Estate Agents Inst. 284, 298 (1949).
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is nothing less than that all advantage which a private owner could derive from
any change in the use made of a piece of land (if it was to be devoted to other
than agricultural purposes) shall in future be confiscated by the government,
and that, therefore, if the principles of the act can be consistently applied, no
private person or corporation will have any incentive to improve economic
efficiency, where this involves a change in the use of land.
To anyone familiar with the history of the Act and the effects which it is
producing, the most curious aspect of the present book is that it attempts to
emphasize throughout the democratic character of the measure and its compatibility with free institutions, while on the basis of the facts provided by the
book itself both are at best pious hopes of highly questionable value. If the author is unaware of the threat to freedom involved, this is probably because he
seems equally oblivious to the fact that consistent application of the principles
of the Act in the long run implies central direction of all economic activity.
Characterization of the measure as particularly democratic squares ill with the
admitted facts that when it was discussed in Parliament almost nobody understood the practically unlimited discretionary powers it conferred on administrative agencies. "[Tihe Opposition often felt in the position of Joseph who was
asked not only to interpret the dream, but to say what the dream was" (p.
177). Furthermore, after the Act had placed in the power of a minister unlimited discretion to lay down even the "general principle" on which its most
important provision was to be administered, the minister in fact issued regulations which "represent a complete change of mind since the time of the debates
of the Act" (p. iii). We shall later have to consider the issue in question.
From a lawyer one might also have expected a little more concern about the
fact, mentioned like many of the less appealing features of the legislation in the
small print of the notes, that "throughout, the Act seems to avoid any recourse
to the courts" (p. 188).

The discussion of the economically most important provisions of the Act is
compressed almost entirely into a few pages of Mr. Haar's book (pp. 98-117),
and in a brief review we must concentrate on these. As is made abundantly clear
throughout the exposition, the basic motive behind all legislation of this kind is
"the ever-present fear of need to pay compensation which constitutes an everpresent threat to bold planning" (p. 'or; cf. pp. 157 and 167). In other words,
it is the desire of the town planners to be relieved of the necessity of counting
the cost of their activities, and it is freely admitted that many of the things
which they regard as desirable would prove impossible if the whole cost, as it is
measured in a market economy, had to be paid. The central aim is therefore to
enable the planning authorities to acquire control over land below the price it
would fetch on a free market. The argument used to justify this aim betrays
a complete failure to understand the significance of these costs. We shall not
stop to examine at length the arguments used in the present book to show why
these costs can in fact not be paid.
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The significance of the market value of land as an indicator of the social cost
of its use for particular purposes is a more fundamental issue. In town planning
literature generally, as in the present book, this question is generally repre'sented as a purely fiscal problem: How these costs are to be met. It is regarded
as solved if the burden can be placed on a particular group, by a partial expropriation of the landowners. But this is not at all the main social problem
involved. The crux of the matter lies in making sure that generally, and in
every particular instance, the advantages derived from planning exceed the
losses of the developments which the planning restrictions prevent. Paying
the owner less than the full value of the land uses which are taken from him
does not reduce the cost to society one whit. It merely makes it possible to
disregard them and go ahead with planning schemes regardless of whether they
repay their total cost. Unless it can be shown that the market prices of land
reflect more than the value of the alternative services to the consumers which
the land would render if allowed to be put to its more profitable use, the direction of the land to other public purposes can be justified only if it can be demonstrated that it will make a contribution to public welfare which is greater than
the value lost. This is what the planners can so rarely demonstrate. But, like
most planners, the town planners, while pretending to take a more comprehensive view, are usually interested only in a limited range of values and wish
to escape the trammels of considerations which they neither understand nor care
for, and which probably no central plan could adequately take into account.
As the present book characteristically puts it, their hope is that in the future the
"decision on the proper use of a piece of land will not be distorted by either the
excessive cost of high development value or of the need of avoiding the payment of compensation, but will be taken strictly on planning merits" (p. 102).
The only serious attempt to justify this approach was made by one of the
British commissions of inquiry which preceded the 1947 legislation, the "Uthwatt Report" on Compensation and Betterment of 1942. This report developed
a curious theory of "floating" and "shifting" values which, though I doubt
whether it is taken seriously by a single reputable economist, appears to have
made a considerable impression on town planners and administrators. It is
based on the assumption that the total value of all the land in a country is a fixed
magnitude, independent of the uses to which the individual pieces of land are
put, and that, in consequence, the control of the use of land has only "the effect
of shifting land values: in other words, it increases the value of some land and
decreases the value of other land, but it does not destroy land values" (p. 99,
quoted from the Uthwatt Report). Now this is not merely, as Mr. Haar suggests, a theory which "may be open to question on the ground of lack of empirical proof" (ibid.). It is sheer nonsense which empirically could neither be
proved nor disproved. There is no useful meaning of the term value of which it
could possibly be true. The situation is not much better with regard to the
theory of "floating value": the assertion that .s a rule the expectation of im-

-T952]

BOOK REVIEWS

pending development will affect the value of more land than will in fact be developed and increase it by more than the value of the actual developments.
Yet even though it may occasionally be true that the market value of land on
the margin of a town may be based on expectations which cannot all be valid,
this surely is a difficulty which could be met by appropriate principles of
valuation and which does not justify complete disregard of market values.
All this does not mean that we want to belittle the difficulty caused by the
fact that while the cost of planning through reducing the value of some land is
not too difficult to recognize and the bearers of the loss certain to claim compensation, the "betterment," i.e., the increases in the value of land due to the
same planning measures are much more difficult to ascertain. Nor can there be
much question that, so far as specific betterments of this kind are ascertainable,
it is desirable that the beneficiaries should be made to contribute to the cost of
planning in proportion. There is much to be said for taxing away increments of
land value which are demonstrably due to public activity. Indeed, of all kinds
of socialism, the nationalization of land would have most to recommend itself
if it were practicable to distinguish the value of the Ricardian "indestructable
and permanent powers of the soil," to which the argument alone applies, from
that value which the efforts of the owner have contributed. The difficulties
here are essentially of a practical nature: the impossibility of distinguishing between these two parts of the value of a piece of land, and the problem of so
adjusting rent contracts as to give the user of the land the appropriate inducements for investment. However, though "only" practical, these difficulties have
nevertheless proved insuperable.
In effect, this was recognized by the Uthwatt Report which, by a "bold departure from precedent" on which the authors specially prided themselves,
started a new development which in the end perverted that reasonable but impracticable idea of the taxation of betterment values into its opposite: instead
of using the taxation of land values as a means of forcing the owners to put their
land to the best use, the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947, under the
name of the Development Charge, in effect imposed a penalty amounting to the
whole gain to be derived from it, on any one putting land to better use. This
transformation of the initial idea began with the Uthwatt Committee's decision
"to cut the Gordian knot by taking for the community some fixed proportion of
the whole of any increase in site values without any attempt at precise analysis
of the causes to which they may be due" (p. 98, quoted from the Uthwatt Report). The further steps leading from this to the 1947 Act were that this principle, which the Uthwatt Report intended to apply only to yet undeveloped
land, was extended to include all redevelopment of land already used for nonagricultural purposes; that, instead of making the value at a fixed date the
basis for determining the increment, the value of any piece of land in the particular use to which it was devoted at any given time became the measure of the
"gain" due to a change in that use-apparently even if the "existing use value"
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had fallen to zero; and finally that, after the measure had been passed by Parliament in the general belief that some 75 or 8o per cent of the difference between
the value in the old use and the value in the new use would be taxed away, the
minister empowered to fix the percentage decided that it should be ioo per cent.
The result is that, as the law now stands, the Central Land Board, entrusted
with levying the Development Charges, is instructed to make it a condition
for permitting any development on land that the whole gain derived from it
be handed over to the government. It would not seem unfair to sum up this
curious evolution by saying that, since what might have made sense theoretically proved to be practically impossible, and since we must have planning
whatever the cost ("even only fairly good planning is to be preferred over the
past chaos"-p. 169), even the most nonsensical principle, if it is only administratively feasible, must be adopted.
It will now be clear that what the British government has undertaken is no
less than to remove the incentive from practically any changes in industrial and
commercial activity which involve any substantial change in the use of land
(the exceptions are so insignificant that we can disregard them for the present
purpose). This is a task which cannot rationally be consummated unless the
government takes responsibility for practically all investment decisions. If it
were to be consistently carried out, land planning would in the end mean central direction of all commercial and industrial activity. No private person or
corporation would have any interest in putting a piece of land to better use or in
starting anything new on British soil, because the gain, which can only be obtained by using some British land for new purposes, would have to go to the
government. Even worse is the fact that since the prospective value of the development must be paid for in cash before the development can be started, the
risk of any uncertain venture will be greatly increased. Sir Arnold Plant, in the
address already mentioned, put it mildly when he concluded that the Act, in its
present form,
threatens to ossify our industrial and commercial structure at the very points at
which flexibility and speed of redeployment are the indispensable requirement of suc2
cessful enterprise in a competitive system.
The illustrations which Sir Arnold offers demonstrate, perhaps better than general discussion, just what the act means in practice:
Thus the ground floor of a commercial building cannot be changed over from use as
an office to use as a shop, a retail shop cannot undertake new wholesale business, a
wholesale warehouse cannot be used for light industry, or vice versa [i.e. without previous planning permission and payment of development charges]. You will be pleased to
know, if you have not yet caught up with Statutory Instrument No. 195 of 9th February, 1949, that although a shop cannot begin to serve its customers with a meal cooked
on the premises, a restaurant may now be turned into a shop. The managements of
our great department stores may not yet all be aware that if they increase the propor2
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tion of their floor space devoted to the restaurant by more than io percent, without
first securing the permission of the local planning authority and paying any development charge demanded by the Central Land Board, they are apparently breaking the law.3
Any number of similar illustrations could be given from the actual decisions
of the Central Land Board. It is one of the most serious defects of Mr. Haar's
book that it gives scarcely any idea of what the application of the new law
means in concrete terms. The fact is that it would no longer be worth while to
make any changes in the use of land if the law were followed literally and the
development charges so fixed as to absorb the whole advantage of the change.
But it is scarcely more reassuring for the prospects of preserving a free society
that in fact all future "developments" will depend on the Central Land Board
authoritatively so ixing the Development Charges in each particular instance
that those developments it wishes to proceed will still remain profitable while
all others become impossible. We cannot attempt to demonstrate here in detail
that the two magnitudes whose difference is to determine the Development
Charge, the "refusal value" (i.e. the value of a piece of land for which permission
for any development is refused) and the "consent value" (the value of this land
after permission for a particular development has been granted) are not objective magnitudes, ascertainable, as the legislator believed, by "normal processes
of valuation." As there can be no longer a market for development values there
will also exist no basis for their valuation. The fixing of the Development
Charges of necessity becomes an arbitrary affair, exempt from any objective
test, and is bound to degenerate into a process of bargaining. The American
observer will have no difficulty in seeing where this is likely to lead when he
reads the following remarkable paragraph from the preface to the pamphlet
called "Practice Notes," in which the Chairman of the Central Land Board
announced the "principles" which the Board proposed to follow in fixing development charges:
The State now owns the value of all development rights in land. We are the managing agents and have to collect the additional value given to a piece of land by the
permission given to develop it for a particular purpose. My colleagues and I are very
conscious of the responsibilities of this new task. A study of these Notes will show that
"value" has many meanings and that to adopt one common meaning for all cases
must produce absurd results in some. We have been given the discretion to decide
which is the fairest to adopt in each case, and have stated some of our present views
in these Notes. Each case, however, must depend on its own facts and a general working rule must always be variable if it does not fit a particular case. We hav'e given instructions to our staff and to our advisers to suggest the fairest value possible for the
case in question and to consider with care the views of any developer who takes an
opposite view. We promise to try to give our own decisions with these points always
in mind.4
3Ibid.

4 z Series, Central Land Board, Practice Notes (1949) at Ill.
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Could the invitation to bargaining be stated in much plainer terms?
There is indeed much that must be explained both to the British and to the
American public about this "daring experiment in social control of the environment" (p. i) into which the British people appear to have stumbled even more
unknowingly than into any of the undesigned institutions which grew up as the
result of free development. If Mr. Haar's prediction be true, "that the 'fifties in
the United States will be marked by a struggle over land planning in much the
same fashion as public housing was the issue in the 'forties," certainly the
British experiment should be carefully studied in this country. Mr. Haar has
faithfully presented the legislative foundations. Perhaps, as the book appears to
be based on a single visit to Britain in 1949, when the Act had only just come
into force, we should not expect more than a descriptive account of its provisions and antecedents. We ought to be grateful to Mr. Haar for offering, in
readable form, the essence of "the massive document of io Parts, 120 long and
involved sections, subdivided into 4o5 subsections [which] runs to no less than
2o6 pages in the King's Printers copy" and which still left "many of the more
important provisions for Regulations, Directions and Orders to be issued by the
Minister of Tqwn and Country Planning" which, even at the time of the writing of the book, had become more voluminous and complex than the Act itself
(p. 8). Yet, convenient as it is to have available an intelligible account of the
British arrangements, the concern with the administrative detail tends to obscure rather than point up the wider significance of the measure. Where a definite goal is set the technique of achieving it is a matter of legitimate interest.
But where, as appears to be true in the present case, administrative expediency
and the narrow considerations of a group of specialists have been allowed to
decide one of the most general issues of economic policy, exclusive concern with
machinery has little value except as a warning. Few readers will derive from
the present book the main lesson the British experience has to teach: the acute
danger that a small group of technical specialists may, in suitable circumstances,
succeed in leading a democracy into legislation which few of those affected by it
would have approved if they had understood what it meant.
FIEDRICH A. vON HAYEK*
II
Our institution of land ownership was inherited from England. Frequently
American lawyers are surprised to discover that legislation, beginning even before the Law of Property Act of 1925,1 has made English land law deviate as
strikingly as our own from the description of historical English land law contained in law school teaching materials. The British Town and Country Plan* Professor of Political and Moral Science, ComiTittee on Social Thought, University of
Chicago.
' 15 & z6 Geo. 5, c. 20.

X952]

BOOK REVIEWS

ning Act of 19472 is the latest in a series of acts3 which compare in stature with
such milestones as Quia Emptores, the Statute of Uses and the Abolition of
Military Tenures Act.
The i947 Act without changing the form of fee simple ownership goes to the
very root of that ownership. Although sponsored by the Labor government it
represents a bi-partisan British decision that all future land use and development is to be guided along communally predetermined channels and not left to
the individual decision of private owners. In effect, it goes a long way towards
transmitting fee simple ownership into ownership of use.4 The "oughtness" of
planning is no longer a matter for debate in England; the English people have
decided to plan. In England "planning" is not merely the production of
"model" programs representing the futuristic dreams of the professional
planner; the plans have prescriptive effect on landowners. It is more than mere
coincidence that in this country the Zoning Digest, a journal on planning law, is
edited and published by the American Society of Planning Officials and that in
England the Journalof PlanningLaw is edited by a conveyancer and published
by a standard law book publishing company. This difference in sponsorship is
symbolic of the effect of planning legislation on the life of the two countries.
Mr. Haar's book accordingly is unique in the growing body of literature in
this country on the Town and Country Planning Act in that it is an analysis of
that act by an American practicing lawyer. Mr. Haar does not merely describe
the objective of this legislation in the high level generalities customarily used by
planners. Instead he has given himself a concrete lawyer-like objective: a
description for the American reader of two important aspects of the new English
planning legislation. He first describes the fundamental administrative machinery, and then goes on to demonstrate just how individual citizens-homeowners, developers, builders, architects and even planners (they too are under
the law)-are affected by the operation of the Act. Mr. Haar has attempted not
only to analyze the British Act, but also to give perspective to our own system
of land planning. All too frequently the American planner ignores the problem
of providing machinery sufficient to put a plan in operation or assures his readers that he has been told by lawyers that the "legal tools" are "available."s
This book describes in detail the "legal tools" developed by the English and the
problems wrestled with in determining how to use them. Mr. Haar's analysis
should dispel any belief that the problem of administration is simply the prob2I O&

iI

Geo. 6, c. 5i.

3See also the Agriculture Act of 1947, io & ii Geo. 6, c. 48 which, a commentator in 12
Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 3 (1947-48) sadly suggests, in effect repeals the Statute of
Quia Emptoresi
4For an argument that fee simple ownership now is "title to the use" see Potter, Caveat
Emptor or Conveyancing under the Planning Acts, 13 Conveyancer and Property Lawyer
36 (1949).
s McDougal, Municipal Land Policy and Control, 242 Annals 88 (1945) is frequently referred to by planners for the conclusion that a variety of legal tools are available for planning.
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lem of deciding which device is the most "efficient" or that the debate about
planning can be conducted on the assumption that the legal tools are available.
Chapter I describes the history of planning legislation in England as a progression from the early multiple dwelling laws regulating safety, then to public
housing and slum clearance legislation, next to public housing legislation with a
planning "rider" and finally to independent planning legislation divorced from
the emphasis on housing and slum clearance. Title I of the United States Housing Act of 19496 would seem to indicate that perhaps we in this country are in
the "rider" stage of development. Large scale planning still requires housing
and slum clearance if it is to have popular support. Chapter I also describes the
administrative machinery for making the act function. This part of the Chapter
may come as a shock to enthusiasts who see in the British Act the "ideal" for
which planners should work in this country. The Chapter indicates that the
British are not much closer than we to solving two basic problems of planning
administration: (i) the relation of the planning agency to operating departments
of the same government and (2) planning a geographical or economic area which
is governed by a number of local governmental units whose political boundaries
do not correspond to those of the economic area. Mr. Haar's book would seem to
indicate that even under the new planning act the Transport Ministry can ignore the roads projected so beautifully on charts or maps by the planners and
locate them elsewhere, and that the Ministry of Defense can build a fuel depot
in an area planned for residential development. The only solution to this problem of division of responsibility which the British Act offers is the "interdepartmental coordinating committee" found a failure in our Federal government
by the Hoover Commission.7 While some progress is made in the British Act
with respect to "planning" a larger area, little "progress" is made in reducing
the number of local governments which must carry out the plan.
Chapter II deals with government supervision of land use and development.
It describes the system of formulating plans for land use and development and
the restrictions on future private development. In this Chapter and Chapter IV
the author describes how the British legislation has reoriented the basic philosophy of planning law. The act is not formulated in terms of negative restrictions
on land utilization. Rather it provides a mechanism whereby the landowner may
be directed towards a use chosen by community officials.
In Chapter III the author deals with another major innovation of the Actnationalizing all development value so that henceforth a developer must buy
the right of development from the government. Here and in his tentative conclusions in Chapter V the author swallows a little too easily the delightfully
simple explanation of the "development charge"-as merely a change of
payees. It is argued by the sponsors of this scheme that formerly a developer
663 Stat. 414 (I949), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1451 (Supp., 1951).

The Task Force Report on Natural Resources, Commission on Organization of the
Executive Branch of the Government 26 (1929)
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paid a landowner a price consisting of existing use value plus potential use
value and that now it pays the same amount but to two payees instead of oneexisting use value to the landowner and the potential use value to the government. This explanation ignores the factor of full knowledge by the only seller
(i.e. the government) of the buyer's intended use, and it also ignores the fact
that part of a developer's incentive to change from one land use to another
arises from his ability to obtain for his own advantage part or all of this "development value" by acquiring the land at its old and less profitable use value.
Mr. Hayek's assertion, in his review of this book and in other writings, that
under a "free market" system all advantage of a change in use of a piece of land
goes to the developer of the new use and that under the British Planning Act all
such advantage will go to the government is unsound in both aspects. While it is
true, as Mr. Hayek suggests, that lawyers and other administrative professions
need a little more understanding of economics, Mr. Hayek's sweeping generalizations demonstrate that the "principle riding" economists likewise need a little
more understanding of the operation of legal and economic institutions.
Lawyers have used the term "market value" for centuries, and its legal
meaning probably does not depart widely from the conventional meaning
of the term. Public or private agencies with the power of condemnation usually
have been unsuccessful in convincing a trier of fact that Mr. Hayek's theory
means that the "market value" payable to a landowner on condemnation is
solely existing use value. Few landowners (none in the United States) resisting
a valuation made by the tax assessor have been successful in establishing that
Mr. Hayek's free market means that the "market value" on which taxes are
payable is a capitalization of the land's earnings. Valuation proceedings in
mortgage foreclosures, rate making, damage actions, security issues, arbitration
proceedings and in hosts of other legal proceedings produce the same conclusion about the operation of the institution of "market value." In each instance,
the trier of fact, aided and abetted by economists acquainted with the institution of the urban land market has insisted that "market value" includes to the
seller something representing prospective use value. 8
To the extent that market value does include for the seller something representing its prospective use value, Mr. Hayek is wrong in saying that the seller
receives from a purchaser converting from one use to another only its existing
use value in the free market. Too much consideration of the institution of the
free market in land has gone into this legal and practical conclusion to permit
acceptance of Mr. Hayek's ancient but untested generalization. In any event,
the British Act takes from the existing landowner this element of market
value and now requires the developer to buy this part of value from the state
instead of the former owner.
Neither am I as certain as Mr. Hayek seems to be that the development
9 See Bonbright, Valuation of Property (r937); Orgel, Valuation under Eminent Domain

(1936).
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charge results in taxing all of the gain on the change of use to the benefit of the
government and that it leaves none of the gain for the developer. The development charge is, as Mr. Hayek says, the difference between "refusal value" and
"consent value." But it is not clear that "consent value" makes no allowance
for the developer's profit or his risk taking on changing uses. See, for example,
the calculation made in (I95i) J. of Planning Law 7o6 at 709 where such an
allowance was made: To the extent that "consent value" is adjusted to allow
for developer's profits he has "incentive" to make the development. This calculation of developer's profil may mean that "consent value" becomes a sum approximately equal to the sum which, under the free market system, the present
owner receives over and above any existing use value. If so, Mr. Haar and the
British Planners are right in saying that the new developer pays no more than
before for developing a piece of land, but now he pays two payees instead of one.
Before praising or condemning the British Act American commentators
ought to read Mr. Haar's careful description and analysis of the provisions. More
than that, this book is a must for American planners who would evaluate our
own system.
American planning enthusiasts continue to chafe at judicial review of the
merits of a planning scheme.9 Have they thought about judicial review of the
merits of a planning scheme in relation to the type of legislation and administrative action they advocate? Under the British Act, a British landowner is
compensated in many instances for loss of value due to planning restrictions;
our planners often ask a court to sustain, without compensation to the landowner, a restriction which makes it impossible for a landowner to develop his
land profitably.1° Under the British Act planners axe compelled to revise their
plans periodically and are directed in many instances to limit their look into the
future to development reasonably foreseeable within five or ten years; our
planners support legislation with no such provisions for flexibility and for
limited crystal-gazing into the future and complain when courts upset old plans
which have turned out to be erroneous." Under the British Act, planning is done
by locally elected policy-making officials whose planning dreams are tempered
by the realization that costs will come out of the voters' pockets; some of our
planning legislation permits planning decisions to be made and put in operation
2
without approval of the local legislative body.
Mr. Haar's book is a useful contribution to our thinking about planning
9 See, e.g., McDougal and Haber, Property, Wealth and Land 820 (1948): "Consider the
difficulties that decisions of this type place in the way of long range planning and the need
they suggest for an integration of powers."
10 See, e.g., Barney & Carey Co. v. Town of Milton, 324 Mass. 440, 87 N.E. 2d 9 (1949).

"See, e.g., Arverne Bay Construction Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y.

222, I5

N.E. 2d 587

(1938).

"2See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.2d 31, 207 P. 2d i (x949).
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whether the reader interprets his remarks about the economics of land use as
an "erroneous" view personal to Mr. Haar or as a description without too much
critical analysis of the "erroneous" views of the British sponsors of the act.
ALLISON DuN'wA*

The Federal Bureau of Investigation. By Max Lowenthal. New York: Sloane
Associates, i95 o . Pp. 559. $4.50.

The Bureau was young when I first met it in 1917. Its official title was, "The
Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice." As such it had no place
in the public mind. The newspaper men took its stories but balked at its title.
Perhaps they called it "The Secret Service," which made the staff of that
ancient and honorable organization unhappy, or perhaps they called it the "Department of Justice," which made uncomfortable those who thought this
derogated from the dignity of the United States Attorney. More often, perhaps,
the stories would be credited merely to a government or Federal agent. The
Bureau was anonymous.
William J. Flynn, head of the Secret Service, became Chief of the Bureau in
I99. He was widely known and had a magazine named after him which
published stories appropriate to its title. In 1921 William J. Burns succeeded
Mr. Flynn. He was a private detective with a country-wide reputation. In the
popular mind he was Mr. Detective himself. But neither Mr. Flynn nor Mr.
Burns succeeded in personifying the Bureau's title. Mr. Hoover took over in
1924. The title of the Bureau was changed to "The Federal Bureau of Investigation." Mr. Lowenthal places the date of the change in 1935. Thereafter, under
its initials FBI, the Bureau has become a household name and has gathered a
popular following that rates it a place in the herd of politically sacred cows.
Mr. Lowenthal raises several questions relative to the Bureau, of which the
most significant in his analysis, may be stated thus: "What is the impact of a
central police force on American Society, a police force which may be and is
dedicated to political purposes?"
He strikes his key note in the opening chapter, where the Bureau's history
begins.
It was 19o8; Charles J. Bonaparte was Attorney General, Theodore Roosevelt, President. Mr. Bonaparte urged upon Congress the importance of creating
a bureau of investigation in his Department. Congress, however, was leery.
One member said that it "would be a great blow to freedom and to free institutions if there should arise in this country any such great secret service bureau
as there is in Russia and was in France under the Emperor, and one time in
Ireland." A contemporary newspaper viewed the proposal in the light of the
"Hated Black Cabinet of St. Petersburg" and of Fouch6, who was the reservoir
of everybody's secrets and intimidated Napoleon himself. It expressed the
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